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Interview One 
Time Log from DVD 
 
Time Log Transcript 
 
00:00:10 Christina Douglass: Good morning.  Today is Wednesday, August 9, 
2006.  We are talking this morning with Dr. Squire Brown.  This interview 
is being conducted in the studios in the Center for Teaching and Learning 
at Wright State University as part of the Cold War Aerospace Technology 
Archives Project.  The interviewer is Christina Douglass.  Thank you very 
much for talking with us this morning, Dr. Brown.  
 
00:00:30 Dr. Squire Brown: My pleasure. 
 
00:00:32 Douglass: Dr. Brown, you retired in 1999 as the Chief of Flight Mechanics 
of the Engineering Directorate at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base.  I 
wonder if you could perhaps give me some background and tell me about 
your experiences as a young boy growing up in Texas, and what started 
your interests in airplanes and aerospace technologies. 
 
00:00:52 Brown: I graduated from high school in 1959 so in coming of age in the 
mid 1950’s in Texas, aviation was everywhere.  The Air Force had a vast 
presence.  Every town seemed to have its air base.  The town where I grew 
up, San Angelo, Texas, had a training base there, so aviation was quite 
fascinating.1  It was everywhere and the context of the Cold War was 
everywhere.  Every evening we’d pick up the newspaper and there would 
be invariably some story of what was happening in the Soviet Union.  The 
adults that I knew were very concerned about Communism and so the two 
issues seemed to just blend in together.  With the launch of Sputnik, the 
nation became very concerned about its scientific and engineering base.2  
There were articles frequently appearing in publications about how we 
needed to train and graduate more scientists and engineers and so as a 
                                                 
1 Goodfellow Air Force Base 
2 October 4, 1957 (Explanation) 
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youngster in high school interested in aviation, it was just very natural to 
be attracted to some form of aviation.  In my case, I decided that going 
into engineering would be a good path. 
 
00:02:26 Douglass:  And where did you attend college? 
 
00:02:28 Brown: After graduating from high school, I went off to the University of 
Texas at Austin, enrolled in the Aerospace Engineering curriculum.  At 
the end of that I graduated in ‘63.  This was an era in which again the 
rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union was still very 
prominent.  This is the era of the beginning of the Apollo program.3  
There was a lot of money for education of scientists and engineers and 
was offered a graduate fellowship sponsored by NASA to continue 
graduate education.  I did that and was awarded a PhD in
I 
 1967.   
                                                
 
00:03:19 Douglass: While you were going through your professional training and 
college, did you encounter any new technologies? 
 
00:03:29 Brown: It was a wonderful time to be going through college.  It was a 
transition looking back on it.  Did not have an awareness at the time, but 
looking back on it, it was a transition between an older form of 
engineering, an older form of engineering education in which handbooks, 
slide rules, hand calculations were the way, the practice.  And beginning 
to go into what we described as a more scientifically based engineering 
beginning to use computers for the first time as a tool and beginning to 
explore new numerical methods that would have been impractical with the 
old days of slide rules and handbooks.  So it was a little blend of both.  At 
one point I even had a course in manufacturing at the university.   The 
engineering school had a small foundry.  We actually went over and 
melted metal and poured it in the sand mold.  I doubt that anybody does 
that anymore.  But that was a routine part of the education and the 
throwback to the older ways.  And then the next hour then you might go to 
a class on theoretical aerodynamics and began to learn how to use new 
computers for that, so it was a time contrast and advance.  For someone 
coming out of west Texas, it was all quite exciting. 
 
00:05:01 Douglass: Following the completion of your PhD work, how did your 
career progress? 
 
00:05:07 Brown: After leaving Austin, my wife and I moved to Seattle.  I took a job 
with Boeing with the commercial airplane division.  At that time 
beginning working in a group, the beginnings of what today we would call 
computational aerodynamics, applying new numerical methods.  Really 
powerful computers were becoming available by then and so for the first 
time, we could introduce a very sophisticated design and analysis methods 
 
3 Brief description of Apollo program, when it began, etc. 
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into the design of aerofoils and wings for high-speed flight.  I spent about 
four years there, designing wings for commercial airplanes.  Again, an 
interesting experience, but about that time, after three or four years, some 
colleagues that had been at the University of Texas with me, Air Force 
officers who were now in management positions at Wright Field, got in 
touch with me.  Wanted to know if I would be interested in moving from 
commercial airplanes to military airplanes.  Sounded like a good deal and 
so I came to Dayton. 
 
00:06:22 Douglass: And what year did you come to work at Wright Field? 
 
00:06:24 Brown: 1971. 
 
00:06:28 Douglass: What was your first assignment? 
 
00:06:31 Brown: I came into an organization known as the Flight Dynamics 
Laboratory, a derivative of the old aircraft lab at Wright Field, an 
organization that with a long and glorious heritage.4  I was working in the 
prototype division of the Flight Dynamics Lab.  We were responsible for 
doing technology integration and looking at advanced systems and 
emphasizing new technologies. 
 
00:07:04 Douglass: Can you tell me what the leadership structure was like at the 
Flight Dynamics Laboratory? 
 
00:07:11 Brown: The laboratory was a component of the Air Force’s formal 
research and development organization that had been created.  The Air 
Force had always emphasized advanced technology.  The Air Force more 
than any of the military services.  Following World War II, the famous 
scientist Theodore von Kármán led a group to forecast, to project where 
the Air Force should go in terms of technology.  That report entitled 
“Toward New Horizons” had a great influence on how the Air Force 
organized and began to proceed into the post-World War II and to the 
Cold War periods. 5  So the organization that I came to in 1971 had some 
legacy from those earlier initiatives.  The Flight Dynamics Lab’s 
responsibility was basically for airplanes, for what were ultimately called 
air vehicles.  There were other laboratories responsible for engines, 
propulsion, for avionic systems, radars, and navigation systems.  There 
was a materials laboratory responsible for basic properties of materials, 
metals, and composites.  There was also a human resources laboratory, the 
aero medical laboratory at the field- organizationally very separate.  
Wright Field had this broad responsibility for all of the technologies that 
might ultimately be used for aeronautical weapon systems. 
 
                                                 
4 Flight Dynamics Lab explanation 
5 Reference for von Karman and “Toward New Horizons” report 
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00:09:02 Douglass: What was your work environment like? 
 
00:09:11 Brown: Wright Field is interesting in that it is probably the only 
engineering organization in the nation which is composed of both civilians 
and military.  The workforce- most of the workforce- the journeymen level 
workforce at the field were civilians.  And then there was an Air Force 
leadership component at the top and those positions changed rather 
frequently whereas the civil servants stayed for a long time.  And then we 
also had junior officers who would be assigned to the laboratory in a ratio 
of maybe one to five- one blue suit to every five or ten civilians.  And the 
value of that was that these officers would come from operational 
assignments maybe in the cockpit, maybe in an engineering center or 
maybe at a higher headquarters.  And so you had this very fertile, very 
stimulating blend of people constantly coming in from the outside, 
bringing new information, new ideas.  And then you had the civilians like 
myself who had been there a long time who were specialists in some 
particular area.  So working together in a group like that, having senior 
military that would come and go and bring new ideas, was always very 
dynamic, very stimulating. 
 
00:10:51 Douglass: Were you aware at the time that the work you were doing- did 
your leadership convey to you that you had a role in the nation’s defense? 
 
00:11:04 Brown: Very much so.  We were constantly admonished that we were not 
there just to advance technology in an abstract sense.  That we had a 
purpose and that was technology for the Air Force, technology for weapon 
systems, technology related to the nation’s defense.  And that was 
bolstered by periodic briefings from intelligence organizations, 
intelligence specialists who would come to us and describe the military 
aspects of the Soviet Union, what they forecasted as the Soviet Union’s 
objectives.  Some information on what the Soviet’s were doing and 
developing specific airplanes, fighter airplanes.  There was a constant 
knowledge that we were engaged in the nation’s defense.  Quite different 
from our counterparts in commercial firms who were there to do the 
company’s business, to maybe develop a better product that the company 
could market.  So the mindset at Wright Field, the mindset of me and my 
colleagues, was quite different from those that we associated with and 
private industry.   
 
00:012:33 Douglass: You mentioned that you were very aware of current Soviet 
technologies and how those impacted your work.  Can you give me some 
examples of some of your projects that you worked on that might have 
been initiated in direct response to learning what the Soviets had or what 
technologies they were developing? 
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00:12:54 Brown: Quite so and at this time period, from the 1960’s on, the standard 
scenario that the Defense Department, national leadership all the way 
down to Wright Field was concerned about was the Soviet presence in 
Eastern Europe.  The vast armored forces, huge air forces all poised to 
invade Western Europe, Germany in particular, and so we were constantly 
challenged to think in terms of technology that might be applied to new 
airplanes that would help defeat such an invasion.  So that applied both to 
air to ground missions, deep strike missions that might destroy the 
Soviet’s ground capability as well as to destroy their air force in the air.  
This is quite a different mission from kind of a classical nuclear deterrence 
mission of long-range strategic bombers with nuclear weapons.  The 
Western European scenario which was primary for us involved enormous 
quantities.  The Soviets were projected to have tens of thousands of 
armored vehicles and so thinking of ways that we might blunt such an 
attack, turn back such an attack, was always in front of us.   
 
00:14:33 Douglass: You mentioned in your book, and actually in a conversation we 
had previously, that this new paradigm was beginning to emerge in the Air 
Force that signaled a shift from aircraft flight performance and design to a 
more multi-disciplinary technology integration.6  Would you say that your 
work fit into this new shifting paradigm? 
 
00:15:00 Brown: That was really one of the most exciting developments of 
particularly the early 1970’s and began to lead to aircraft like the F-16.  In 
this shift in the way we thought of engineering, this shift in tools available 
to us, the emergence of powerful digital computers, the experience in 
Southeast Asia, the Vietnam War, the transition from an Air Force that 
regarded the strategic nuclear mission as the one and only mission into an 
Air Force that began to recognize that they needed to consider the non-
nuclear warfare, the theater war, what today we would recognize as 
precision-guided munitions.  So the shift began to change from an 
emphasis on just aircraft performance, which really through World War II, 
had served us well.  If you could build a fast airplane, that was good, if 
you could build a more maneuverable airplane, that in itself was good.  
Now we were discovering that life was much more complicated and new 
tools, or new ways of thinking about design begin to emerge.  For 
example, best remembered today is something called the Energy 
Maneuverability Theory, something that was created by Colonel John 
Boyd, the late 60’s.7  And that really began to change the whole nature of 
how we approached the design problem.  Energy maneuverability was a 
technique that could not have been done in the old days of slide rules and 
pencil and paper.  It required very powerful computers, but it began to 
give us insight into the characteristics of how we should be designing Air 
                                                 
6 Cite Squire’s book 
7 Reference for Boyd and Theory 
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Force aeronautical weapon systems.  The F-16 is probably an outstanding 
example of an airplane to emerge from that thought process.   
 
00:17:06 Douglass: You mentioned that computers really did play a significant role, 
not only in the shift of this paradigm, but in engineering as a whole.  What 
was your personal experience with computers, in your work setting? 
 
00:17:20: Brown: I love to talk about this.  Through my adult lifetime, from the time 
I left west Texas and went off to the university and first encountered a 
computer, it’s just been one astonishment after another.  From the earliest 
days of undergraduate of learning to program a computer and began to 
adapt methods and then to watch as new opportunities for new methods 
were created.  [I] mentioned the Energy Maneuverability, new ways of 
understanding the design and effectiveness problems.  Gradually, digital 
computers, more properly, microprocessors emerged, and created multiple 
paths for us.  In the design process itself, computers had sufficient power,  
we had new software that a single person could replace a whole design 
team.  Where before it might have taken a dozen specialists working six 
months to create a new concept, a single individual now sitting down and 
in a space of a few days could do the whole job.  So productivity went 
way up, our ability to look at many different options went way up.  Then 
computers became increasingly more powerful and cheaper, an era of 
computational plenty.   
  Computers began to be applied to the airplanes themselves.  
Airborne computers that changed flight control systems, that changed 
cockpit design, cockpit displays that changed mission systems, such as 
radars, navigation, changed weapons, the armament, and ultimately, with 
the arrival of the desktop computer, changed how we worked in the office 
and how we communicated, how we did routine administrative chores.  
Ultimately, at the arrival of the web and our ability to communicate 
instantly anywhere in the world.  The emergence of simulation, 
simulators.  Before that era, the only thing to do was to go out and build an 
airplane and fly it and see how it worked.  Well with simulators, now we 
could do everything on the ground.  We could begin to simulate air 
combat.  We created multiple pilot stations, had the ability to project onto 
a screen something that would look like actual air warfare, pilots could fly 
these, evaluate them, give us feedback before we ever cut the first piece of 
metal.  So throughout my lifetime, computers have just continued to 
amaze and astonish us.  But when I was an undergraduate, we thought it 
was marvelous that we could get away from some of the tedious 
calculations.  Never in our wildest imaginations would we have 
envisioned what computers ultimately allowed us to do. 
 
00:20:50 Douglass: I wonder, Dr. Brown, if you could tell me more about the 
process of coming up a new concept.  Was there a brainstorming session, 
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did you sit down with your colleagues and discuss a particular problem or 
issue that needed to be addressed? 
 
00:21:14 Brown: This is part of the business that I really enjoyed.  There were 
multiple inputs.  The creation of a new system, something like the F-22 
and I spent years and years in one form or another on the F-22 because it 
literally took years for that concept to evolve.  It’s a combination of again, 
looking at a foreign threat, Soviet Union, what do we need to ensure 
superiority for that.  We look at new technologies that are coming along 
and how we might use those, look at inputs from the operational 
commands, the people who are actually in charge of conducting flying the 
airplanes and conducting warfare.  We would organize forecasting projects 
in which you would bring together a wide array of individuals from 
different kinds of backgrounds to discuss the future.  And so those might 
be specialists from industry, they might be academicians, might be retired 
military folks, bring a lot of historical perspective.  So there were multiple 
inputs, multiple paths to begin to stimulate the whole thought process 
about what we might do, how we would begin to create a system.  It was a 
lot of dialogue, a lot of back and forth.  The air staff at the Pentagon would 
say, “Well we think we need an airplane to fly this far and to carry this 
many weapons,” and we would go back and look at that and say “Well, 
here’s about how much it might cost, and here’s what we think the 
effectiveness might be.”  And so they’d say, “Well, that’s interesting.”  
Then they would go back and say, “Well, what about this?”  And so there 
was constant, constant dialogue, constant trying out new designs and 
looking at effectiveness data, trying to figure out which way we should go.  
It was really a wonderful business. 
 
00:23:41 Douglass: Now this [forecasting], was there ever a moment where perhaps 
you were at home some evening and you turned on the news and saw 
something and you went in the next day thought, “Goodness, we need to 
rethink this?”  How much did the media at the time, or how much did 
current event type things affect that process of [forecasting] and sitting 
down and thinking, okay we need to go a different direction? 
 
00:24:18 Brown: I don’t recall that the public information, public periodicals, 
whether it was television or news magazines, this is all before the Internet.  
I don’t recall those as having a particular influence.  We benefited from 
individuals who might have worked for the government or worked for 
private firms who just seemed to have a gift for imagining the future, of 
being able to look out and relate seemingly unrelated events, and begin to 
provide some interpretation of what it might be.  I always enjoyed 
encountering those individuals, they were really very prized.  The 
beginning of what we sometimes refer to ‘think-tanks’—the RAND 
Corporation was the original one—in which they would bring together 
individuals who had this particular gift of being able to think 
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unconstrained by what was at hand, that could indeed begin to imagine 
possibilities and the future.8  I was never very good at that.  I was always 
the very practical engineer, worried about what the equations would tell 
me and the data from the wind tunnel.  But it was enormously stimulating 
to encounter such individuals because they really could open up 
possibilities and always came away from those sessions really invigorated 
about what the future might hold. 
 
00:26:05 Douglass: You mentioned that a lot your information came through 
intelligence, and I wonder if you could tell me a little about any security 
issues or what the general mood was during this Cold War era at Wright 
Field. 
 
00:26:24 Brown: The security was often a problem.  The intelligence people very 
rightly maintained a very close hold on sources and the information that 
we received from them.  We would go to these briefings and receive these 
documents and they were always classified and had to be protected and it 
was not easy to share information that we learned from that in an open 
forum.  That was somewhat limiting.  A more serious problem was the 
very process of technology development.  As with intellectual exercise, it 
benefits from the widest possible dialogue, and so you think of 
professional society meetings, the AIAA—American Institute of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics—the premier organization.9  At their 
conferences, attracting individuals from all over the country and all 
different aspects, if there were security issues, then it inhibited the 
exchange of ideas and the overall dialogue.  But if people came to Wright 
Field and they had the proper clearances, then we could talk to them in 
that environment.  There were a number of people that would suggest that 
excessive classification would really inhibit technology progress.  I think 
the whole stealth exercise illustrates that that was not necessarily so.  
Stealth was developed in a very classified environment, and very 
successful, but, yes, security issues, dealing with classified information 
was an inhibitor to free flow of information, and sometimes to just plain 
work efficiency. 
 
00:28:50 Douglass: Turning to another current event thing that happened during the 
late 60’s, early 70’s, the conflict in Southeast Asia, Vietnam, obviously 
presented new challenges for the Air Force and the existing technology.  
In your opinion, what were these challenges, and what effect did these 
challenges have on your work at your laboratory? 
 
00:29:18 Brown: I think the effect of the experience in Southeast Asia, which was a 
long and complex affair, it would be difficult to overstate the effect that 
that conflict had.  For the Air Force, it began as early as 1961, would not 
                                                 
8 Footnote for Research and Development (RAND) Corporation 
9 Reference for the AIAA 
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end until 1973, so it’s over twelve years, over three times longer then 
World War II, and it was a conflict that the Air Force was not really 
prepared to engage in.  Through the 1950’s into the early 60’s, the 
emphasis had been on the strategic nuclear mission.  The Strategic Air 
Command and the Air Force, while it gave some notional 
acknowledgment to the possibility of non-nuclear conflict, regarded that as 
remote and really did not give it any priority.  And so when we got into 
Southeast Asia and were having to engage in a non-nuclear confrontation, 
and the different kinds of missions that the Air Force was really quite 
unprepared for, it created a real crisis across the service and really created 
a resurgence in the interest in aeronautical systems.  Up through the 
1950’s, 1960’s, it looked like we were going to go to push-button warfare, 
which was a common term at the time—intercontinental ballistic missiles, 
long-range guided missiles, push-button warfare, questions as to whether 
or not you would ever need a pilot in a cockpit again.  All of that changed 
and so a number of very serious issues arose that demanded the attention 
of the laboratories.   
  A couple of them, for example, survivablity, vulnerability, became 
really important.  The effect of anti-aircraft fire on fighter airplanes.  That 
had always been a problem through World War II, Korea, but some of 
those lessons had been forgotten, regarded as never going to happen again.  
We were concerned with a nuclear confrontation in Western Europe.  It 
just didn’t seem reasonable to pay any attention to gunfire on an airplane.  
But we started losing fighters over North Vietnam, an alarming situation, 
and so it was a big scramble to initiate programs to look at the effect of 
anti-aircraft bullets, ballistic rounds, on fuel tanks, on control systems, to 
do something that would enable the pilot to survive being hit and at least 
be able to control the airplane long enough to get it into a situation where 
he could safely eject.   
  The problem of flying qualities of high performance airplanes 
again became an issue.  The F-4, which the Air Force adapted from the 
Navy- in Southeast Asia there were many examples of Navy systems, 
adapted for the Air Force simply because the Navy had been concerned 
more about this type of conflict then the Air Force.  But the F-4, originally 
a Navy airplane, was a very capable airplane flown straight and level, but 
as pilots began to execute maneuvers, air-to-air, air-to ground over the 
north, they found that the airplane had an alarming tendency, at angle of 
attack to stall and spin.  They didn’t know how to recover, so we were 
simply losing airplanes because of flying qualities, and so they had to 
initiate new programs to understand once again angle of attack, flight 
preventing stalled, especially preventing spins, departures that the pi-, low 
altitude that the pilot had no change to recover from.  Ah, so those are just 
a couple of illustrations that mark the reemergence of interest in 
aeronautical technologies during the 60’s. 
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00:33:55 Douglass: During this time when the focus was, as you said, directed more 
towards new programs which would make flying technology better during 
the Vietnam conflict, did the Cold War and the Soviet threat take a back 
seat to this, or was it still a prevalent thought in your mind or in your co-
worker’s, or the overall goal of the flight laboratory? 
 
00:34:12 Brown: The Cold War, the Soviet bear was still prominent.  The systems 
that we encountered in North Vietnam were Soviet manufactured, Soviet 
supplied systems.  They were the same systems that we would expect to 
encounter in Western Europe, so the situation in Southeast Asia was taken 
very seriously.  Many people regarded it as a surrogate Soviet initiative.  It 
was quite common in that time period to regard the Soviets as directing 
these kinds of conflicts and so it was not regarded as simply a local war, 
fighting against an autonomous force.  It was really regarded as an 
extension of the Soviet Union and it was- for example, out of that 
experience came really the stealth initiative—stealth being a term 
implying invisibility to radar—became very aware that radar controlled 
our defense systems.  The Soviet systems supplied to the North 
Vietnamese were very deadly and that if we hoped to have any chance of 
surviving the conflict in Western Europe, we’re going to have to deal with 
those and you know, out of that emerged the initiative for stealth and 
being able to evade radar. 
 
00:36:03 Douglass: After Vietnam, and in relation to aircraft design and technology, 
what were the lessons learned from that conflict and the technologies that 
came out of the conflict in Southeast Asia? 
 
00:36:21 Brown: Southeast Asia changed the Air Force.  The Air Force through the 
1960’s had been commanded by a leadership that came of age in World 
War II that saw long-range bombers and nuclear weapons as the way to 
conduct warfare.  But out of the experience of Southeast Asia came a new 
generation.  Some authors have described this as the “rise of the fighter-
generals,” and there was a group that’s almost become legendary of this 
time period, the late 60’s, early 70’s, known as the “fighter mafia,” in the 
Pentagon, a group had great influence on airplanes like the F-15, the F-
16.10   So there emerged a generation of leaders that saw the Air Force as 
having a different kind of mission, a mission that would use precision-
guided munitions- we think of the laser-guided bombs, the first of these.  
 If I could tell one story, involving a person, a well-known person, 
Colonel Robin Olds, who was Commander of the 8th Tactical Fighter 
Wing in 1965, 1966, in Southeast Asia.11  This is good to tell because the 
F-4 that Robin Olds flew is in the Museum, and I had my own slight 
encounter with Robin Olds which made a lasting impression on me.  
Robin Olds had been a pilot in World War II.  He was an ace and his  
                                                 
10 Reference for the term/concept ‘fighter mafia’ 
11 Reference for Olds 
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mission, the F-4 in his unit would fly north and attack targets in North 
Vietnam, and it’s reported as he did that, he would tell his young 
lieutenant in the backseat that this was no different from flying over 
Germany in 1944.  That the Air Force had done nothing to invest in 
technologies that would help his mission, that here he was flying a Navy 
airplane, was more then just a matter of pride with him.  It was a signal to 
him that the Air Force leadership had not taken this kind of mission 
seriously and let him down and here he was having to do a job in a Navy 
airplane with the same technology, the same iron bombs that he had had in 
1944 over Germany.  As Robin Olds and his colleagues began to rotate 
back from Southeast Asia, they begin to have meetings with the science 
and engineering community and begin to demand that we turn our 
attention to the problems that they were having.   
  And so out of that became initiatives that, for example, led to the 
first laser-guided bomb, something that would in fact help the tactical 
units destroy their targets without incurring horrendous losses.  With these 
technologies, the effectiveness went way up, the losses went way down.  
Folks like Robin Olds and John Boyd and many others like that had a 
really transforming influence on the Air Force.  They were exciting 
individuals to encounter, very charismatic leaders, very inspirational, and 
out of that we begin to get precision-guided weapons, stealth, different 
systems of radar and radar controlled airplanes, all kinds of marvelous 
stuff.  Probably the best example then in the 1990’s Gulf War, you know, 
by that time, it had all evolved, had matured and was ready for use and 
was just tremendously effective in the first Gulf War. 
 
00:40:30 Douglass: Were you still with the Flight Dynamics Laboratory following 
the Vietnam War? 
 
00:34:00 Brown: I came in there and stayed for some years.  Now the old civil 
servant model that we all came to and expected, you know, you were 
assigned to an organization and you were going to be there forever.  
People just didn’t, as a rule, just did not move.  And it was the military 
that moved and carried the ideas and stimulated.  The civil servants stayed 
in once place.  But sometime in the late 80’s, I was by then Chief of the 
Technology Assessment Division, and the Air Force leadership looking 
out at industry and commercial practices began to get this notion that 
maybe the old civil servant model wasn’t the best and we needed to start 
moving people around.  So I started taking a journey [laughs] that took me 
out of the Lab and took me to what we called XR, the Development 
Planning Directorate—whole different organization, separate from the 
labs.  And there for a while I was Chief of the Design Branch, and then in 
another spasm of personnel initiatives, they decided to merge that with 
what was the Engineering Directorate.  Engineering Directorate was 
responsible for [clears throat] engineering development, the SPOs—the 
Systems Program Office—support the B-2s, and C-17s, and airplanes like 
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that.  So I got moved over there.  They looked at me, I looked at them, we 
weren’t sure what to make of each other [laughs].  But it all worked out 
really well, it was a different culture, and so for the last several years of 
my career, I was then Chief of Flight Mechanics in the Engineering 
Directorate.  So I went all the way in my career, I went all the way from 
an organization responsible for research, initiating projects, all the way up 
through supervising engineers who were responsible for solving real 
problems on real airplanes that were in service. 
 
00:43:12 Douglass: Did your perceptions of your missions change as you went from 
assignment to assignment, obviously moving up the ladder, shall we say, 
going from research to, as you say, Chief of Engineering at the 
Engineering Directorate.  How did that- how did your perceptions change 
regarding the Cold War and the work being done at Wright Field? 
 
00:43:45 Brown: I would like to think that the Air Force, that the leadership of the 
laboratories, had done a good job for all of us, of helping us to understand 
what our purpose was, how we related to the Air Force.  And so as I 
moved through these different organizations, the ultimate purpose was 
kind of still the same, still trying to develop superior aeronautical weapon 
systems.  What we begin to find though was that the external environment 
began to change, that because of budget pressures, cost, there was ever 
more pressure on the Wright Field community to do something about 
these enormously expensive weapon systems.  We would go forward with 
a new design and so, you know, the airplane that this new design was 
going to replace also cost twice or three times as much and, [clears throat] 
and there was a lot of pressure from Washington and other sources to get 
new technology into service, to get an advantage over the Soviet Union, 
but to spend less money [laughs], to do it more cheaply.  So I would say 
that it was the external environment that really began to change.  There 
was also the end of the Cold War, a consolidation in industry, changes in 
practices, [pauses] let me just leave it there for the moment, yeah. 
 
00:45:59 Douglass: The early 90’s which of course brought- the world saw the end 
of the Cold War.  How did engineering and practices change the 
laboratories at Wright Field, or your position?  What became the focus? 
 
00:46:17 Brown: I remember the end of the Cold War and through the end of my 
career as being a time of some confusion.  The Soviet Union had clearly 
gone away, but our mindset, we were by then, so embedded in this culture 
of always creating superior systems.  The F-22 was still the number one 
development program, we were bringing the B-2 online- clearly Cold War 
systems.  We were engaged in the concept for joint-strike fighter, and it 
was hard to move away from that old image of confronting the vast 
armies, air forces of the Soviet Union.  And higher headquarters, the 
Washington community was struggling with a way to characterize the new 
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world.  There were clearly the massive budget cuts, drawdowns of forces, 
closing of bases, and similar pressures on the research and development 
community.  We were going to have smaller workforce, fewer dollars, but 
some confusion about what we were supposed to do, some time of 
uncertainty.  And I truthfully don’t know how that’s been resolved; I’ve 
been away from it, so I’m not sure at all how it was ultimately been 
resolved. 
 
00:48:02 Douglass: Before we discussed the concept that you used in the laboratory, 
the futurecasting, and of course many great concepts and ideas came out 
of that process.  Were there any concepts that never came to fruition or 
proved to be, proved not to stand the test of time? 
 
00:48:28 Brown: Looking at things that didn’t happen is just as fascinating, if not 
more so then the success stories.  And yes, there were numerous examples 
of, where we had the technology in hand, could really do it, but ultimately 
the cost and the military utility were deemed not sufficient and probably 
the most prominent was vertical take-off and landing for the Air Force.  
Now the Marines, as you know, have ultimately used that, but the Air 
Force looked at that off and on.  We clearly had experimental programs, it 
was clearly something we could do, but they were never persuaded that 
the operational utility was sufficient to purchase the system.  Transports 
with short take-off and landing, another example, for example, the early 
1970’s we built two prototypes—the YC-14, the YC-15—tested those.  
Performed really well, but they were intended to be C-130 replacements, 
but the Air Force ultimately decided that they were too expensive for the 
advantage that they incurred.   
  On a broader theme, the whole business of supersonic flight turned 
out to be quite interesting.  We have very few supersonic airplanes today- 
supersonic flight turns out not a lot of utility and is very expensive.  But 
when I was an undergraduate, if you had polled my classmates, we would 
have said to a man that we expected to spend our careers designing 
supersonic airplanes.  Ah, has not worked out that way.  The few airplanes 
that we have had that emphasize maximum speed turned out to be 
disappointments in terms of military utility.  Ultimately became far more 
effective to have subsonic airplanes with stealth, so we think of the F-117 
stealth fighter, subsonic airplane, we think of the B-2, stealth bomber, long 
range strategic bomber, again subsonic, so the initiatives for supersonic 
flight, we think of airplanes like the B-58, a Mach 2 bomber that did serve 
briefly.  We think of the XB-70 airplane that never went past the prototype 
stage.  Airplanes like the F-104, very spectacular speed, but again, 
marginal utility, so at the end of the day, it did not work out that way.  
Airplanes like the F-15s, F-16s do have the ability to accelerate to 
supersonic speeds, but we find that thrust away, that power loading is 
really more of an advantage to engage and disengage in combat then it is 
to really fly fast.  That’s been one of the really big surprises of my career. 
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00:51:00 Douglass: At this time, I think we’d like to take a break. 
 
 
End of Video Tape 1 
 
Start of Video Tape 2 
 
00:00:00 Douglass:  Dr. Brown, I wonder if you could give me some specific 
examples of the concepts and programs that you worked on when you 
were with the Flight Dynamics Laboratory? 
 
00:00:15 Brown:  When I came to the lab in the early 70’s, the great excitement on 
the base were the prototype systems.  Secretary of Defense Packard12 had 
part of the transformation coming out of the experience in Southeast Asia, 
felt like the service should get back to doing more experimental work, 
more prototyping work.  Out of that emerged three programs that I recall.  
One of them was the lightweight fighter program, which eventually 
became the F-16.  Another was the advanced medium-stole transport I 
mentioned earlier that ultimately was manifested in the YC-14 and the 
YC-15- those did not go into production.  And then we were becoming 
very interested in pilotless surveillance vehicles.  Out of that came a 
couple of systems, known as Compass Cope, airplanes that could stay in 
the air a long time, fly long distances, pilotless.13  Those did not go into 
production for a couple of interesting reasons having to do with a lack of 
technology at the time.  But today we recognize those as the heritage for a 
very important Air Force system known as Global Hawk, one of the most 
sophisticated and useful surveillance systems in the Air Force today.14  
   That was the environment of the early 70’s, working on those.  
But it wasn’t long before we began to get the first stirrings of what was to 
become the F-22.  In those days, it was known as the “advanced tactical 
fighter.”  Weren’t even sure of the mission of it at that time, a lot of 
dialogue between proponents of the deep-strike airplane, a replacement F-
111, other proponents of air to air as a replacement for the F-15, and so 
that gestation period would start in the late 70’s, would go into the 1980’s.  
I think the program office was established in 1984.  The prototypes flew in 
the early 1990’s.  Production started sometime around 2000.  The airplane, 
it’s just now coming into operational service.  So that’s been almost three 
decades from the time that we first started serious analysis, design 
concepts to the time it’s become an operational system, gives you some 
appreciation for the complexity of trying to understand what we’ve got.  
And the long duration is also a recognition of the expense of this system.  
                                                 
12 Reference for Packard 
13 Reference for Compass Cope 
14 Reference for Global Hawk 
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It’s going to be- has been so terrifically expensive that everybody wanted 
to proceed very cautiously. 
 
00:03:31 Douglass: You mentioned that you worked on the design concepts for the 
F-16 in the early 1970’s.  It is now 2006 and the F-16 of course is still one 
of the Air Force’s premier fighter airplanes.  Does that surprise you, or do 
you feel done a good job creating an aircraft that has withstood the test of 
time? 
 
00:03:58 Brown: That’s a very subtle question.  The model, when I was a youngster 
the model that we were, our concept, our vision of how things worked, 
was we would design an airplane, we’d build it, it would go into service, 
last a few years, and then something else would come along to take its 
place.  But with the current generation of airplanes, the F-15, the F-16, 
what we’ve learned to do is over the lifetime of the airplane, continue to 
improve it so that the airplane today that we know of as the F-16 is greatly 
improved, much greater capability then the airplane that we knew of the 
early 1970’s.  Over its time period, more powerful engines have become 
available, those have been installed.  The early models had an analog 
computer control system; those have been replaced by digital control 
systems.  The armament has improved and been adapted for those new 
radar systems.  So while the airplane itself looks superficially like that 
airplane of the early 1970’s, underneath the skin, it’s quite a different 
machine.  So along with lots of other unanticipated developments, that has 
to be classified as one of them, we’re learning to make airplanes.   
  Oh, I should mention one other technology that’s become very 
important and that is the technology of fatigue of structures.  That began to 
emerge in the 1960’s. [clears throat]  Part of that, we just didn’t fly 
airplanes long enough for fatigue, the wearing out of the airframe, to be an 
issue.  But now we are keeping airplanes in service so long that a constant 
monitoring and knowing how to design long-lived airplanes became 
important, so the materials, the structural design of those emerged to 
become a critical technology. 
 
00:06:22 Douglass: If you could do some futurecasting right now in 2006, what do 
you see?  Where do you see technology going in relation to the Air Force? 
 
00:06:39 Brown: I’ve proved to myself over and over that I, my capabilities as a 
forecaster are dismally poor.  I’ve continued to be surprised and delighted 
with what happens in the world of technology, the world of aviation.  As I 
mentioned earlier, the computer, basically the microprocessor, has 
provided just an unending series of surprises.  The integration of space 
with aeronautical systems has been an unanticipated surprise.  We think 
about navigation provided by the global positioning system that we just 
didn’t imagine years ago.  I’m hesitant [laughs], I’m really hesitant to try 
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to project anything.  It will, whatever turns out to be, we’ll be surprised.  
Pleasantly surprised. 
 
00:08:03 Douglass: Is there anything else that you would like to cover today that we 
haven’t touched on yet? 
 
00:08:10 Brown: I think the business of space and aeronautical systems deserves 
some elaboration.  Again, one of the things that didn’t turn out exactly like 
we intended.  Late 50’s, early 60’s, we expected space systems, spacecraft 
to emulate the model of early aviation, that we would have a few primitive 
systems first of all that send up a few astronauts, that gradually it would 
become routine, that the military would develop spacecraft for military 
purposes.  We would send up crews just as routinely as we launched B-
52s.  So everyday, some crew on a military airplane would go into orbit.  
Clearly that hasn’t happened.  Instead, satellites , robotic systems, systems 
controlled by microprocessors and having other fantastic technologies 
have turned out to be far more useful then we ever anticipated.  In the 
1960’s, one of the problems that we projected was that spacecraft would 
be very unreliable, that again the model of airplanes and engines and 
radios with tubes, high failure rate.  We expected that to happen in 
satellites, and so satellites were going to be limited, we were going to have 
to send up crews to actually work on them in space.  Instead they became 
with solid-state technology, digital technology, became extraordinarily 
reliable, could do all kinds of things.  And it’s turned out that human space 
flight has had marginal utility.  Some of the reason that we don’t have 
military space flight has been a consequence of treaties that have largely 
banned militarization of space.15  But even at that, the utility of satellites 
for communication, for reconnaissance, for navigation has benefited the 
world of aeronautics.  And we can fly anywhere now easily, readily, stay 
in constant communication.  We fly B-2s from Lightman AFB in the 
middle of Missouri all the way to Baghdad and back, with a crew of two!  
Something that would have been unthinkable.  We can do that because the 
airplane is controlled by onboard computers and software, flies the 
airplane, the global positioning system takes care of the navigation, 
meteorological satellites forecast the weather all the way around the world 
that plan a flight path that that is efficient, stays away from trouble.  So to 
me, that’s the modern Air Force- a blend of space assets and aeronautical 
assets, space assets largely satellites, not human craft. 
 
00:11:22 Douglass: As my final question for today, I’d like to ask you what you 
would tell a future historian what the significance of Wright Field was 
during the Cold War? 
 
00:11:43 Brown: I think all of us that worked at the Field believed that Wright Field 
was necessary as a stimulus for new ideas, a stimulus to take risk.  
                                                 
15 Citation for Outer Space Treaty, Space Preservation Treaty 
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Ultimately, weapon systems are built by contractors, private firms and of 
course their incentive and the way the operate makes them somewhat risk-
averse.  They would operate somewhat more conservatively.  They are a 
civilian organization and as with all civilian organizations tend to develop 
their own internal culture, their own way of looking at the world.  With 
Wright Field, we looked across all of the companies and believe me, each 
of them was different, had different culture, different way of thinking 
about the world.  And so we could broker ideas, we could stimulate people 
to think about new possibilities.  Not everything worked out- our ideas 
were not always the ones that carried the day.  But without that stimulus, I 
don’t think we would have had the really superb systems that we do today.  
And fly-by-wire, I think, technology, which all modern airplanes have fly-
by-wire; Wright Field played a critical role in that at a time, if you go back 
and read the early papers, the early conferences, companies were very 
reluctant to move into this technology.16  They understood the old 
mechanical systems, they were comfortable with that, it was reliable, safe.  
They weren’t at all sure that they wanted to take the risk of moving out of 
that and so here at Wright Field, we modified airplanes, put those control 
systems in, had test pilots flying, demonstrated the viability of it, 
demonstrated how it would benefit new airplanes and how you could do 
new things like fly an unstable airplane, something you could never do 
with the old mechanical control systems.  And so the stimulus, the risk-
taking that Wright Field could engage in was powerful in terms of 
ultimately creating new systems.  You would not have had an F-16 
without a fly-by-wire system.  You would not have had the stealth fighter 
without a fly-by wire system.  So that’s the importance of Wright Field, a 
place that represents the operational Air Force, that could tell the 
contractors “Here’s the way we think we should be going, and here’s some 
new ideas, and, you know,  let the games begin.”  It was always a very 
stimulating environment. 
 
00:14:54 Douglass: Well thank you again for speaking with us today, Dr. Brown.  I 
look forward to speaking with you next week. 
 
00:15:00 Brown: Thank you very much, I’ve enjoyed this session. 
 
End of Video Tape Two 
 







16 Fly-By Wire flight control system reference 
